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Acronyms
2
CME Coronal Mass Ejection
COTS Commercial Off The Shelf 
DDD Displacement Damage Dose
EEE Electrical, Electronic, and Electromechanical 
ELDRS Enhanced Low Dose Rate Sensitivity
EP Enhanced Performance
ESA European Space Agency
GCR Galactic Cosmic Ray
GOMAC Government Microcircuits Applications and Critical Technologies Conference
GSFC Goddard Space Flight Center 
GSN Goal Structuring Notation
HEART Hardened Electronics and Radiation Technology
LEO low earth orbit
LET Linear Energy Transfer
MBMA model based mission assurance 
MRQW Microelectronics Reliability and Qualification Workshop
NAND Negated AND or NOT AND
NASA National Aeronautics and Space Administration 
NEPP NASA Electronic Parts and Packaging 
NEPP ETW NASA Electronic Parts and Packaging (NEPP) Program Electronics Technology Workshop
NSREC Nuclear and Space Radiation Effects Conference
RADECS Radiation Effects on Components and Systems
RHA Radiation Hardeness Assurance
SAA South Atlantic Anomaly
SEE Single Event Effects
SEE/MAPLD 
SEE-MAPLD Single Event Effects (SEE) Symposium/
Military and Aerospace Programmable Logic Devices (MAPLD) 
Workshop
SEGR Single Event Gate Rupture
SEL Single Event Latchup
SEP Single Event Effects Phenomena (includes SEU, SEL, SEGR and SET)
SERESSA School on the Effects of Radiation on Embedded Systems for Space Applications
SET Single Event Transient
SEU Single Event Upset
SLU Saint Louis University
SwaP Size, weight, and power
TID Total Ionizing Dose
TID Total Ionizing Dose
TMR triple-modular redundancy
TNID Total Non-Ionizing Dose
UV Ultra-Violet
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3NEPP Program- Small Mission Efforts
Reliable 
Small 
Missions
Model-Based 
Mission 
Assurance 
(MBMA)
• W NASA R&M 
Program
Best 
Practices and 
Guidelines
COTS and 
Non-Mil Data
SEE 
Reliability 
Analysis CubeSat 
Mission 
Success 
Analysis
CubeSat 
Databases
Working 
Groups
* NASA Reliability & Maintainability
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Outline
• New Space and SmallSat Considerations
• The Natural Space Radiation Environment Hazard
• Radiation Effects on Micro-Electronics
• Hardness Assurance, as a Discipline, with its Challenges
• New Technologies
• New Architectures
• Unbound Risks
• Building Smart Requirements
• Risk Acceptance and Guidance
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New Space – New Point of View
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ESSCON : Eccofet
Component Grades are MergingSmallSats Come in Many Sizes
Risk acceptance is being used as a means 
to enable innovation
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2000< 100g - Femtosatellite
0.1 - 1 kg - Picosatellite
1 - 10 kg - Nanosatellite
10 - 100 kg - Microsatellite
100 - 500 kg - Minisatellite
500 - 1000kg – Small satellite
1000 - 2500kg – Medium satellite
2500 – 3500kg – Large Satellite
3500 – 5000kg – Very Large Satellite
>5000kg – Extra Large Satellite
Seradata SpaceTrak Data
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New Space – Looking Ahead
Constellations and Swarms New Space = New Companies
Seradata SpaceTrak Data (Notional Launches)
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New Space – Same Old Radiation 
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• New mission concepts and SmallSat paradigm
• Radiation challenges identified in the past are here to stay; 
adoption of new technologies are often the risk driver
• Commercial Space, Constellations, Small missions, etc. will 
benefit from detailed hazard definition and mission specific 
requirements
• The need for Radiation Hardness Assurance (RHA)
• Radiation effects are a mix of disciplines, evolve with 
technologies and techniques
• Misinterpretation of failure modes / misuse of available data 
can lead to over/under design
• RHA flow doesn’t change, risk acceptance needs to be 
tailored 
• Some Top Level Resources
• NPR-7120.5 – NASA Agency Program Management
• GPR-8705.4 – NASA Goddard Risk Classification Guidelines
• NASA-STD-8739.10 – NASA Parts Assurance Standard 
https://sdo.gsfc.nasa.gov
https://www.nasa.gov/van-allen-probes
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Who Needs This Guidance?
• Universities / CubeSats
• May be first-time designers, or previous missions did not 
have requirements
• Schedule driven, limited time for development
• Rideshares – could end up in multiple environments
• Space Agencies / Government
• More compact designs in new destinations
• Cost savings of SmallSat platform, with more reliable 
outcome
• More willing to trade risk for capability 
• Device / Subsystem Manufacturers
• Product / Device offerings: Space Plastic, EP, LeanRel, 
radiation tolerant, modified HiRel, etc.
• Fault tolerance in designs
8
NASA's Goddard Space Flight Center/Bill Hrybyk
Michael Swartwout, SLU CubeSat Database
This presentation to be published on nepp.nasa.gov, originally presented by Michael J. Campola at Radiation 
and its Effects on Components and Systems (RADECS), Montpellier, France, September 16, 2019.
Trapped Particles in 
Planetary Magnetic Fields
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Natural Space Radiation Environment
Galactic Cosmic Rays Solar Activity
Energetic supernovae remnants 
(~GeV, Z=1-92) 
Originate outside of our solar 
system
Solar Wind, Solar Cycle
CMEs (proton rich)
Flares (heavy ion rich) 
Fluctuate with Solar Activity and Events
Not a perfect dipole
Protons and Electrons trapped at different 
L-shell values and energies
Images from left to right – NASA FERMI X-ray telescope, Solar 
Dynamics Observatory, Janet Barth (radhome.gsfc.nasa.gov)
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Spacecraft Charging, Ionizing Dose, Non-Ionizing 
Dose, Single Event Effects, Drag, Surface Erosion, 
Debris/Micro-Meteoroid Impacts, Thermal Cycles
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Natural Space Radiation Environment
• Plasma
• Particle Radiation
• Neutral Gas Particles
• UV and X-Ray 
• Orbital Debris
Degradation of micro-electronics
Degradation of optical components
Degradation of solar cells
Data corruption
Noise on images
System shutdowns or resets
Circuit Damage
Part tolerances exceeded
wear-out
(After Barth)
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Natural Space Radiation Environment
• Particle Radiation
Degradation of micro-electronics
Degradation of optical components
Degradation of solar cells
Data corruption
Noise on images
System shutdowns or resets
Circuit Damage
Part tolerances exceeded
wear-out
TNID/
Typical Bathtub
(After Buchner)
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Single EventDegradation
Conventional Units Explanation
• Total Ionizing Dose (TID)
• Absorbed dose (rad(Si))
1 rad = 100 erg/g = 0.01 J/kg; 100 rad = 1 Gy
• Always specified for a particular material 
1 rad(SiO2), 10 krad(Si), 100 Gy(H2O)
• This is not exposure (R), or dose equivalent (Sv)
• Total Non-Ionizing Dose (TNID)
• Fluence (particles/cm2) 
Number of particles per unit area
• Displacement Damage Dose (DDD) 
Specified at a given incident particle energy - e.g., 
10 MeV p+, 50 MeV p+, 1 MeV eq. neutrons, etc.
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• Linear Energy Transfer (LET) 
• Stopping power normalized to target material
• Units are MeV.cm2/mg
• Cross Section (σ) 
• Device particle interaction (cm2)
• Used in calculation of rate 
Can be /device or /bit per time interval
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Degradation Contributors vs. Single Event
13
• Cumulative effects 
• Depend highly on which contributors and duration in 
their presence
• Mimic wear-out/aging 
• TNID and TID must be accounted for
• Typical destinations (LEO, GEO)
• LEO at low altitude/inclination is more protected by 
the Geomagnetic field
• Proximity to the poles & SAA show a large variability 
in dose despite short mission durations
• Electrons and their braking radiation are the big 
offender in Geostationary orbits (don’t forget about 
spacecraft charging…)
• Note that
• A little bit of shielding goes a long way 
• Altitude plays a huge role when in/near the radiation 
belts (even transiting)
• Beyond Geomagnetic field, highly variable solar 
environment contributions (Solar cycle)
Degradation has a strong dependence on where you 
go, not just how long you are on orbit
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Degradation vs. Single Event Contributors
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• One particle causes the effect
• Random in nature, particle must traverse sensitive 
structure within device and have sufficient charge 
creation along its path
• Shielding doesn’t do so much for highly energetic 
particles
• Device technology can be dependent on particle species
• Typical Destinations (LEO, GEO)
• Again altitude plays a role; for some devices that is a 
direct threat
• You are exposed to more GCR + Solar contribution as 
geomagnetic protection is reduced
• Natural phenomena like the South Atlantic Anomaly 
(SAA), magnetic poles, are temporal drivers
• Note that
• There will be a background rate, solar cycle 
dependence, solar event rate, increased rate for poles 
or SAA – not just one rate to consider
Single event contributors benefit very little from 
shielding, have dependence on where you are
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Summary of Environmental Hazards
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GEO Yes No Severe Yes Yes No Yes No No No No 
LEO (low-
incl) No Yes Moderate No No No 
Not 
usual No No No No 
LEO Polar No Yes Moderate Yes Yes No Not usual No No No No 
International 
Space Station No Yes Moderate 
Yes - 
partial Minimal Yes Yes No Yes No No 
Interplanetary 
During 
phasing 
orbits; 
Possible 
Other 
Planet 
During 
phasing 
orbits; 
Possible 
Other 
Planet 
During 
phasing 
orbits; 
Possible 
Other 
Planet 
Yes Yes No Yes Maybe No Yes Maybe 
Exploration – 
Lunar, Mars, 
Jupiter 
Phasing 
orbits 
During 
phasing 
orbits 
During 
phasing 
orbits 
Yes Yes Possibly Yes Maybe No Yes Yes 
 https://radhome.gsfc.nasa.gov/radhome/papers/SSPVSE05_LaBel.pdf
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Environment
LEO Equatorial LEO Polar (Sun Sync) GEO / Interplanetary
M
is
si
on
Li
fe
tim
e >
 3
 Y
ea
rs Moderate Dose /Attenuated GCR, Trapped 
Proton, SAA, Some Solar 
Proton dependence for 
variation
High Dose /
Higher GCR, High Energy 
Trapped Protons in SAA and 
Poles, Some Solar Proton 
dependence for variation
High Dose / 
High GCR, High Solar Proton 
Variability
1-
3 
Ye
ar
s Manageable Dose / 
Attenuated GCR, Trapped 
Proton, SAA, Some Solar 
Proton dependence for 
variation
Moderate Dose / 
Higher GCR, High Energy 
Trapped Protons in SAA and 
Poles, Some Solar Proton 
dependence for variation
High Dose / High GCR, High 
Solar Proton Variability
< 
1 
Ye
ar
Manageable Dose / 
Attenuated GCR, Trapped 
Proton, SAA, Some Solar 
Proton dependence for 
variation
Moderate Dose / Higher GCR, 
High Energy Trapped Protons 
in SAA and Poles, Some Solar 
Proton dependence for 
variation
Moderate Dose /
High GCR, High Solar Proton 
Variability
Radiation Hazard Contributors for Dose and SEE
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Radiation Effects on Active Microelectronic Devices
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• Cumulative effects and single event effects can both be 
permanently damaging
• TID/DDD lead to wear-out of device operation and degrade 
devices beyond acceptable operations internally and externally
• Single Event Effects can be catastrophic instantaneously by 
turning on parasitic devices within the semiconductor or inducing 
electric field across dielectrics that eventually break down
• Synergistic effects can make ground based testing very difficult
• Destructive Single Event Effects (SEEs)
• Irreversible processes 
• Terms: Latchup, Burnout, Gate Rupture
• Non-Destructive SEEs
• Lead to interruptions in operation and/or errors leading to 
unknown state spaces or loss of science / mission if not 
accounted for
• Terms: Functional Interrupt, Transients, Upsets
• IEEE / Papers / Short Courses / Presentations
• GOMAC, HEART, MRQW, NEPP ETW, NSREC, RADECS, 
SEE/MAPLD, SERESSA, SPWG
Megan Casey - https://nepp.nasa.gov/files/26196/2014-561-Casey-
Final-Web-Pres-ETW-Diodes-TN16278_v2.pdf
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Device and Particle Interaction
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Oxide
Metal
Oxide
Metal
Recombination Nuclear Displacement Oxide Charge Trapping
Brock J. LaMeres, Colin Delaney, Matt Johnson, Connor Julien, Kevin Zack, Ben Cunningham Todd Kaiser, Larry Springer, David Klumpar, "Next on the Pad: RadSat – A Radiation Tolerant 
Computer System," Proceedings of the 31st Annual AIAA/USU Conference on Small Satellites, Logan UT, USA, Aug. 5-10, 2017, paper: SSC17-III-11, 
URL: http://digitalcommons.usu.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=3618&context=smallsat
Instantaneous Cumulative
Field 
Oxide+ + +    - - -
+ +    - -
+    -
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Table of SEE Susceptibility
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Ray Ladbury, https://ntrs.nasa.gov/archive/nasa/casi.ntrs.nasa.gov/20170006865.pdf
List is not exhaustive, but new failure modes are found in new devices, so it would not be 
possible to capture all
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Outline
• New Space and SmallSat Considerations
• The Natural Space Radiation Environment Hazard
• Radiation Effects on Micro-Electronics
• Hardness Assurance, as a Discipline, with its Challenges
• New Technologies
• New Architectures
• Unbound Risks
• Building Smart Requirements
• Risk Acceptance and Guidance
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The People: Radiation Effects Engineers
Materials
• Material Property 
degradations with 
radiation
• Energy loss in 
materials
Device Physics
• Charge transport
• Device Process 
Dependencies 
• Charge 
dependency of 
device operation
Electrical 
Engineering
• Part to part 
interconnections
• Understanding 
circuit response
• Device functions 
and taxonomy
Systems 
Engineering
• Requirements
• System Level 
Impacts
• Understanding 
interconnections
• Understanding 
functionality
Space Physics
• Space weather
• Environment 
models/modeling
• Radiation Sources 
and variability 
The Job: Watch For the ‘ilities
Survivability
• Must survive until needed
• Entire mission?
• Screening for early 
failures in components
Availability
• Must perform when 
necessary
• Subset of time on orbit
• Operational modes
• Environmental response
Reliability
• Resultant of all
• Many aspects and 
disciplines
• Known unknowns
Criticality
• Impact to the system
• Part or subsystem 
function
• Mission objectives
21
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Paths to Space Radiation
22
Space Radiation Ecosystem
Systems 
Engineering 
Background
Space Weather 
Physics 
Background
Device Physics / 
Electrical Engineering 
Background
● Radiation Reqs. 
Definition
● SPENVIS, OMERE, 
Fastrad, etc.
● Radiation Testing 
Management
● Mission Scientists / PIs
● Model Developers
(e.g. AP9/AE9)
● Often University + 
Research Lab based
● Radiation Testing + 
Qualification 
● EEE Parts Programs
After Whitney Lohmeyer, presented at JPL meeting 2019
This presentation to be published on nepp.nasa.gov, originally presented by Michael J. Campola at Radiation and its Effects on Components and Systems (RADECS), 
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Radiation Hardness Assurance (RHA) Overview
23
(After LaBel 2004)
RHA consists of all 
activities undertaken to 
ensure that the 
electronics and materials 
of a space system 
perform to their design
specifications throughout 
exposure to the mission 
space environment
(After Poivey 2007)
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RHA Challenges…
Not So Small
• Always in a dynamic environment
• New Technologies
- Device Topology / Speed / Power
- Increased COTS parts / subsystem usage
• New Mission Architectures
- Profiles of mission life, objective, and cost are evolving
- Oversight gives way to insight in some mission 
classifications
- Ground systems, do no harm, hosted payloads
- Similarity and heritage data requirements widening
• Quantifying Risk
- Translation of system requirements to radiation trades 
can be problematic
- Determining appropriate mitigation level (operational, 
system,  circuit/software, device, material, etc.)
Unbound radiation risks are likely
24
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and its Effects on Components and Systems (RADECS), Montpellier, France, September 16, 2019.
3D
 M
em
or
y 
St
ru
ct
ur
es
New Technologies - New Susceptibilities
• Feature Size / Critical Charge 
• Sensitivity to muons? Low energy 
protons?
• 3D Stacking / Structures 
• Deep sensitive volumes
• New materials within structure
• Testing Challenges
• Complexity (e.g., Systems-on-a-Chip)
• Speed of interfaces 
• Obfuscation of state-space
• Flux / range of beam at facilities
• Function
• Integrated Photonics, MEMS, Hybrids
Without detailed part information you do 
not have certainty of the radiation threats
25
IEEE/DOI: 10.1109/TCPMT.2019.2910863
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www.micron.com
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Allowable LossesSingle Strain
New Mission Architectures - How Many to Succeed?
Redundancy alone does not remove the threat, adds complexity 
26
vs 
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New Challenges in Quantifying Risk
From Risk Assessment section of NASA Program Management 7120.5
27
Can only get there with enough information about the system or the chosen device, need to 
have a known hazard and a known response
This presentation to be published on nepp.nasa.gov, originally presented by Michael J. Campola at Radiation and its Effects on Components and Systems (RADECS), 
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Free-Field
Environment 
Definition
Internal
Environment 
Definition
Shielding
System Sub-system Parts
Known Hazard
Define and Evaluate the Hazard
Performance 
Requirements
Reliability
Requirements
Parametric
Requirements
Known Risk
Derive Smart Requirements
RHA Building Blocks
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Risks Abound, What is Critical?
• Parts
• Parametric degradation and leakage currents allowable in application?
• Downstream/peripheral circuits considered?
• Reset/refresh capability?
• Mitigation within too complex?
• Predicted radiation response unknown– loss of part functionality critical?
• Subsystem
• Functionally required to mission that the subsystem work?
• Interfaces allow you to get to a known state if all goes wrong?
• System
• Increased power dissipation a mission ender?
• Availability outweighed by error circumvention?
• Data retention through reboots? What if there is science data loss?
• Communications interruptions overwhelm? 
• Navigation or Attitude determination unable to deal with faults?
29
vs.
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• Hardness Assurance is the 
practice of designing for 
radiation effects
• What it takes to overcome the 
radiation challenges
• Competing failure modes
30
RHA Flow Doesn’t Change With Accepted Risk
(After Barth/Poivey)
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• Hardness Assurance is the 
practice of designing for 
radiation effects
• What it takes to overcome the 
radiation challenges
• Competing failure modes
• Focus for impact on risk 
acceptance:
- Failure Awareness
- Countermeasures/Mitigation
- Mission Requirements
31
RHA Flow Doesn’t Change With Accepted Risk
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Focus For Risk Acceptance
• Failure Awareness
• Know your hazard from the natural environment
• Know your devices potential failure mechanisms or response (data)
• Countermeasures and Mitigation
• Where are they necessary?
• At what level (part, card, box, mission)
• Smart Requirements – and Eventually Smart Trades
32
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Define and Evaluate the Hazard
33
• Define the Environment
– External to the spacecraft
• Evaluate the Environment
– Internal to the spacecraft
• Define the Requirements
– Define criticality factors
• Evaluate Design/Components
– Existing data/Testing
– Performance characteristics
• “Engineer” with Designers
– Parts replacement/Mitigation schemes
• Iterate Process
– Review parts list based on updated knowledge
Environment Severity/Mission Lifetime
Low Medium High
C
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y
H
ig
h
Manageable
Dose /
SEE impact to 
survivability or 
availability
Moderate Dose /
SEE impact to 
survivability or 
availability
High Dose / 
SEE impact to 
survivability or 
availability
M
ed
iu
m Manageable
Dose / 
SEE needs
mitigation
Moderate Dose / 
SEE needs 
mitigation
High Dose / 
SEE needs 
mitigation
Lo
w Manageable Dose / 
SEE do no harm 
Moderate Dose /
SEE do no harm
High Dose /
SEE do no harm
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Environment Severity/Mission Lifetime
Low Medium High
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Dose-Depth / 
Ray-trace
GCR and 
Proton Spectra
for typical 
conditions
Dose-Depth / 
Ray-trace
GCR and proton 
Spectra for all 
conditions
Ray-Trace for 
subsystem / 
GCR and proton 
Spectra for all 
conditions
M
ed
iu
m Dose-Depth / 
GCR and proton 
spectra for 
background
Dose-Depth /
GCR and 
Proton Spectra
For background
Dose-Depth 
evaluation at 
shielding / 
All spectra
conditions
Lo
w
Similar mission 
dose, same 
solar cycle / 
GCR spectra
Dose-Depth /
GCR spectra
Dose-Depth /
GCR and 
Proton Spectra
For background
• Define the Environment
– External to the spacecraft
• Evaluate the Environment
– Internal to the spacecraft
• Define the Requirements
– Define criticality factors
• Evaluate Design/Components
– Existing data/Testing
– Performance characteristics
• “Engineer” with Designers
– Parts replacement/Mitigation schemes
• Iterate Process
– Review parts list based on updated knowledge
Derive Smart Requirements
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Mitigation and Countermeasure Optimization
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K.A. LaBel, A.H. Johnston, J.L. Barth, R.A. Reed, C.E. Barnes, “Emerging Radiation Hardness Assurance (RHA) issues: A NASA approach for space flight programs,” 
IEEE Trans. Nucl. Sci., pp. 2727-2736, Dec. 1998.
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Building Requirements
• Requirements by Environment
• Requirements by Technology
• Additional Considerations
o LET Requirements for SEE
o Dose Calculation
o Operation During Flare Conditions
o Radiation Data
36
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Requirements by Environment
37
• Trapped Radiation Belts
- Can lead to high doses in a short mission: 
Jovian 
- Can lead to spatially dependent SEE 
responses: South Atlantic Anomaly (SAA)
• Heliocentric Orbits
- Solar Events, highly dynamic, energetic, 
directional
- Solar Wind, will depend on the solar cycle
- No planetary magnetic field attenuation
In essence the requirements are always 
driven by the environment, some more than 
others create a unique challenge
NASA JPL Cassini, http://saturn.jpl.nasa.gov,
Output from OMERE freeware http://www.trad.fr/en/space/omere-software/
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Requirements by Technology
38
• Technologies exhibit specific physics of failure
- Not easy to group them all
- Opto-electronics - Displacement in the material
- Bipolar - Enhanced Low Dose Rate Sensitivity
- Digital CMOS - Latchup or SEFI
- Power devices - SEGR/SEB
- Analog/Mixed-Signal – Interruptions on PLLs, 
SERDES, clock dividers, etc. 
• Test Data requirements
- Failure distributions, often not enough parts
- Destructive effects are one data point, 
variability from part to part 
- Statistics of the fit for rate calculations
Requirements should only be made applicable 
to the technologies that need to meet mission 
objectives and can benefit
R. Zuleeg, “Radiation Effects In GaAs FET Devices,”
Proc. IEEE, Vol. 77, p.389, 1989.
D. Chen, test report nepp.nasa.gov, 2016
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Considerations for SEE Requirements
• SEL
o Environment and technology driven, risk avoidance
o Protection circuitry / diode deratings
• SEGR, SEB
o Effect driven, normally incident is usually the worst 
case
o Testing to establish Safe Operating Area (SOA)
• SET
o Don’t harm downstream parts via 
overvoltage/overstress on I/O, or accumulate over 
integrations
o Can be internal - hybrids
• SEU
o Tailored Filtering, EDAC, or Scrubbing
• MBU, MCU, SEFI, Locked States 
o Application Voltage or Pattern dependence
o Watchdogs / reset capability
• Proton SEE susceptible parts need evaluated in detail:
o Low-energy proton effects: 
o May have direct ionization
o RHA for proton sensitivity update coming:
https://nepp.nasa.gov/files/25401/Proton_RHAGuide_NASAAug09.pdf
• FPGA Mitigation Strategies (M. Berg)
https://ntrs.nasa.gov/archive/nasa/casi.ntrs.nasa.gov/20180007760.pdf
N. A. Dodds et al., doi: 10.1109/TNS.2015.2486763
D. Chen, test report radhome.nasa.gov, 2015
T. Wilcox, NSREC Poster DW, 2019
J. Lauenstein et al., doi:10.1109/NSREC.2017.8115473
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Why You Can’t Relax an LET Requirement
• Rate calculations are not the same 
for Destructive vs. Non-destructive
o Data are a limiting factor, one part = one 
data point
o For SEE types that exist in a given 
technology, they present a constant risk in 
time domain
• When you require by LET: 
o Spectrum from environment is imparted on 
sensitive volumes, where we get LET 
thresholds (>75 vs. 60 vs. 37 MeV.cm2/mg)
o Effective LET increases with angle – critical 
charge is what we are trying to determine
o CRÈME calculation integrates the two
o Deep sensitive volumes won’t necessarily 
get same LET each time with mono-
energetic beams
Ray Ladbury, NSREC2017 SC,
https://ntrs.nasa.gov/archive/nasa/casi.ntrs.nasa.gov/20170006865.pdf
R
at
e 
ca
lc
ul
at
io
ns
Se
ns
iti
ve
 V
ol
um
es
"Space Radiation Effects on Microelectronics," NASA Jet Propulsion Laboratory
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Appreciable Mission Doses 
41
• Maybe degradation of a part beyond 
usage is okay? 
o Criticality and Application
• Did you forget about DDD? 
o External materials are susceptible as well, 
polymers can be bad actors and are often 
on commercial ground based optical 
systems
• Even short missions can have a 
common failure mode
• Low mass budget? 
o Can optimize shielding if you have failure 
distribution of intended components
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Mike Xapsos, https://doi.org/10.1109/TNS.2016.2607021
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Operation During Flare Conditions: Think Availability
42
• Don’t dose out during storm (nor the full mission) 
• Calculate the dose (TID/TNID) of the mission in full –
95% confidence level recommended
• Calculate the dose contribution from N number of events (protons & x-rays), if dose 
from N is > 5% of the total dose, increase confidence level of full mission model
• Don’t destructively fail from a single particle during the storm 
(nor the full mission)
• Standard risk-avoidant SEE approach: no destructive effects allowed 
• LET threshold for single event latchup (SEL) 
> 75 MeV.cm2/mg (some use 60 MeV.cm2/mg)
• LET threshold for single event burnout, gate rupture, dielectric rupture (SEB, SEGR) 
> 37 MeV.cm2/mg (particles must come from normal incidence to cause effect)
• If you have non-destructive single event upsets, they can’t 
overwhelm critical instruments/systems during the storm
• Rate calculation requires part data representative of the application, looking for cross-
section over LET. 
• If parts’ LET threshold from 20 to 75 MeV.cm2/mg, need heavy ion rate
• If parts’ LET threshold is below 20, need indirect ionization from recoil ions contribution 
to rate (need proton data) – make sure packaging materials don’t add to this, direct 
ionization from protons (can be built-in to heavy ion calculation) possible
• Do you need to mitigate or not – confirm that event rates are not higher than mitigation 
(Markov process… i.e. EDAC beats the number accrued, scrub rate is faster than 
critical number of upset accumulation)
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Solar Energetic Particle Models
Solar particle model: CREME-96 (peak 5min)
Solar particle model: CREME-96 (worst day)
Solar particle model: CREME-96 (worst week)
Solar particle model: 24 Oct 1989 event (worst case composition)
Solar particle model: 22 Oct 1989 event (worst case composition)
Solar particle model: 19 Oct 1989 event (worst case composition)
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Risk Acceptance – Data Available?
• Part Classifications Growing
• Mil/Aero vs. Industrial vs. Medical
• Automotive vs. Commercial vs. Modified HiRel
• Substitute COTS in this diagram
• Now you have another degree of separation
• Failure modes not fully understood
• Unlikely to have historical data
• Similarity data no applicable due to fab, process, or 
design rules
• Cost of testing usually too high
Without traceability you may be depending on non-
representative data.
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Ray Ladbury, NSREC2017 SC,
https://ntrs.nasa.gov/archive/nasa/casi.ntrs.nasa.gov/20170006865.pdf
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Environment
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Notional Radiation Data Collection Guidelines
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When Do You Test? When Do You Model?
45
• Divine your risk threshold
• There’s a doc coming for that… 
radhome.gsfc.nasa.gov/nepp.nasa.gov
• Unknown failure modes that would not be 
acceptable to the mission
• Known unknowns can be carried as a risk if you 
already know that the outcome is mitigated at the 
board or box level
• New technologies should be identified early on
• Fault propagation may be the problem you wish to 
mitigate
• This can include cumulative effects!
• Fault injection may not be able to cover the state 
space
• Destructive single event effects are an obvious 
target
• Can you tolerate a part replacement in your design 
cycle?
• Lead times, board re-spins, etc.
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Model Based Mission Assurance (MBMA) as a Tool
FPG
A
FPG
A
DDR
DDR
DDR
DDR
Goal Structuring Notation (GSN)
• Concept of operations 
• Requirements and Availability are 
fed down correctly to subsystem
• Evidence is presented
• Assumptions are tracked
Environment, Device, & Design
• Models and Test Data are 
brought together to get rates of 
upset / failure distributions
• Resources and Utilization are 
the scaling factors with criticality
46
Systems Modeling Language
• Description of System 
Connections and Dependencies
• Receives GSN readily
• Fault propagation can be 
identified
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Goal Structuring Notation (GSN)
47
Evidence
Sub-Goals
Strategy
Goal Operate Through Solar Flare Conditions
No part failures from 
added TID or DDD
Calculate 
Mission Dose
Dose Behind 
Shielding and 
part data/rating
Calculate Dose 
from N number 
of events
Carried in 
margin on dose 
calculations
No Destructive SEE
LET threshold driven by 
environment and 
technology physics of 
failure
Part Data, Safe 
Operating Area, or 
Rating
Non-destructive SEE 
cannot overwhelm
Likelihood and 
Availability must 
meet mission 
needs
Rate 
calculation 
based on 
part data
Mitigation 
Scheme
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Questions to Keep in Mind
48
• What are the radiation risks: 
• What is the hazard? 
• What are the challenges?
• What can you do to reduce the 
risk for a given hazard?
• What does changing that radiation 
environment mean for success?
• Need availability throughout the 
mission or at specific times? 
• How do similar systems/devices 
react in the space environment?
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THANK YOU
michael.j.campola@nasa.gov
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